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FEDERAL LAW REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM:
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
Gerard Hildebrand
Since the creation of the federal-state unemployment compensation (UC) system in 1935, the desirability of federal
requirements has been a subject of debate. It can only be
expected that this debate, along with attempts to add to, delete,
or amend the federal requirements, will continue. An understanding of what happens to a federal requirement once it is
enacted, and of the United States Department ofLabor's (DOL)
general approach toward interpreting and applying the
requirement, should be a part of any discussion concerning the
desirability of federal requirements.
The notion that states generally are free to operate their UC
programs without dictation from Washington is the major
influence on DOL's application of federal law. This has had
varying effects on different types of federal provisions, which
I divide into three categories for purposes of this Article: discretionary provisions, minimum requirements, and absolute
requirements.
I. DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS

The main discretionary provision is the requirement in section
303(a)(l) of the Social Security Act that state law contain such
"methods of administration ... as are found by the Secretary
of Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of
unemployment compensation when due." 1 Over the years, DOL
largely has interpret~d this requirement to apply only to operationalizing other federal requirements, such as payment through
public employment offices, the right to a fair hearing, the
requirement that amounts withdrawn from the unemployment
fund be limited to cash payments to individuals. The wide scope
of this provision would have allowed the Department to create

1.

42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(l) (1988).
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many more requirements than were created. In fact, since Java, 2
much of the impetus for interpreting and applying this provision
has shifted to the courts.

II. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
Many of the provisions in federal law require states to meet
only a minimum requirement, which a state is free to go beyond.
When a new requirement is placed on the states, DOL generally
has appeared to follow two rules of construction. First, since
the requirement impinges on areas otherwise left to the states,
it is construed as narrowly as possible while reasonably
effectuating the requirement's purpose. The second rule of
construction, a corollary to the first, requires that any language
which may be construed as leaving discretion to the states
should be broadly construed, unless there are compelling reasons
for a narrow construction.
For example, the "double dip" provision of section 3304(a)(7)
of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),3 the alien provision of section 3304(a)(14)(A) of FUTA, and the pension de-

duction provision of section 3304(a)(15) of FUTA, allow states
to be more restrictive but not more liberal than DOL's position.
On the other hand, the approved training requirement of section
3304(a)(8) of FUTA has been interpreted in such a way that
states must only include the basic requirement in their laws;
what constitutes approved training is up to the states.

III. ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS
"Absolutes" differ from the "minimum" federal requirements
discussed above in that states have no latitude under these
requirements. The "absolute" character of these requirements
is derived from the federal law itself, which denies DOL
authority to apply the rules of construction that it uses for
minimum requirements.

2.
3.

California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
FUTA is codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Some absolutes are easy to administer for conformity and
compliance purposes. An example is the requirement that for
certain nonprofit organizations and state and local governmental
entities, states pay UC based on services performed on the same
terms and conditions as apply to other services covered under
state law. The "between and within terms denial" is more
difficult to administer, as is the "systematic and sustained" work
search effort required for extended benefits (EB). Both incorrectly assume that all states would make the same determination given the same set of facts.
It also is impossible for DOL to provide guidance on every
situation or to monitor every determination. DOL has, therefore,
created a framework under which states have at least some
latitude. In the between and within terms denial, this latitude
consists of allowing states to determine whether a reasonable
assurance exists in cases where the economic terms and
conditions of the employment in the second academic period
differ from those in the first. The EB "systematic and sustained"
work search effort simply requires states to make determinations
under a federal framework, based on the local labor market,
which allows the actual application to vary considerably from
state to state.
A major problem in administering federal requirements is
that there may be situations in which the requirement may
be circumvented. This is particularly true with the deposit
and withdrawal standards of sections 3304(a)(3) and (4) of
FUTA, which impose restrictions on the states concerning the
use of the unemployment trusts while in the hands of the
beneficiary-the state. Because states interpret their own
laws, however, states could claim that they are adhering to
standards, while actually circumventing them. For example,
states have claimed that certain moneys are not unemployment fund moneys and therefore could be used for non-UC
purposes, even wheti applicable laws make clear that the
moneys do belong to the unemployment fund.
IV. CONCLUSIONS-WHAT

TYPE OF FEDERAL
REQUIREMENTS ARE DESIRABLE?

Federal requirements work most effectively, from the perspective of Federal administration, when they allow states to
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simply establish specific criteria in their laws. An example is
the "double dip" requirement, under which state law simply
establishes the amount of work necessary to establish a second
benefit year. This type of requirement is easily verified and,
in most cases, after the state enacts the provision, few conformity or compliance issues will arise. Requirements which do not
meet this test should be avoided. When Congress wishes to
address a specific matter, it should explore whether the federal
requirement is better framed as a minimum requirement. For
example, the between and within terms denial provisions of
federal law could have been framed to require states to create
provisions providing for such a denial for individuals expected
to return to educational employment, while leaving it to the
states to craft the specific provisions. Presumably, educational
institutions, their employees, and the public sector would work
jointly to develop equitable provisions. DOL's role would then
be similar to the approved training requirement-simply to
assure that the state law contained some provision addressing
between and within terms situations. This approach might not
work for every type ofrequirement. For example, for the denial
of UC to aliens, this solution may not be as viable, since there
may not be any public or private sector interest in a state for
creating a meaningful provision of state law.
The problem with setting certain federal requirements, as in
the case of approved training, is that states could enact
provisions oflaw ostensibly designed to meet the requirements,
which in effect are meaningless. Although it may be impossible
to frame all standards in a way that prevents states from paying
lip service to them, Congress should consider seriously this issue
whenever a requirement is created. It is unlikely that any state
would approve of any provision that allows DOL to tell the state
what its law means (which appears to be the only solution for
the deposit and withdrawal standards); however, it is possible
to fashion requirements where compliance is easily tested. The
"double dip" provision, for example, avoids this lip service. Its
requirement is so clear that a state could not argue that its law
required work following the beginning of a benefit year unless
its law actually did.
Finally, it is obvious that framers of new requirements should
be careful to assure that the statutory language effectuates their
intent. This is perhaps even more critical for federal UC
requirements, given that DOL usually interprets a new provision
of law as placing the least burden on the states.

